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Private Colleges and Global Patterns 
Comparisons between the private sector in Israel and else-
where show the relative strength of Israel's private colleges.
Considering quality, while most of the country's private col-
leges are not so well regarded academically, they appear to post
good results for students entering the job market—a typical
goal of private higher education institutions worldwide.
Moreover, if at least 4 of Israel's 9 private colleges are credited
with academic soundness, that is a rather large share in the
global context, where most private institutions are regarded as
quite low. These Israeli institutions may even be candidates to
claim “semi-elite” status within the private sector—based on a
reasonable degree of academic quality, appeal, seriousness,
credibility, and entrepreneurialism. Such achievements do not
characterize most of the world's private institutions. 
Extraordinary in the global context is that some of Israel's
private colleges have high-quality faculty, even figures of vaunt-
ed national stature. Indeed, Israel's public universities com-
plain that they find it increasingly difficult to recruit top talent
as some private colleges can pay much more. Related and
equally extraordinary is that Israel's private higher education
receives substantial philanthropy, so rare outside the United
States. This policy helps provide ability to hire their esteemed
faculty and also to build very attractive facilities, provide flexi-
bility, and gain credibility. 
Not only do Israel's private colleges have enviable positive
characteristics uncommon in most of the world, they also lack
the most negative characteristics. Israel does have the fly-by-
night demand-absorbing private institutions. Additionally,
Israel remains apart from the burgeoning international ten-
dency to permit for-profit education, though it conforms to a
wider reality wherein several of the nonprofit institutions have
for-profit characteristics and are charged by critics with being
for-profit in reality.
The Government Role
As commonly found in other countries, private colleges com-
plain that their strength is undermined by government regula-
tion. In fact Israel's regulatory debate largely follows contours
rather common elsewhere.
Israeli private colleges regard the national Council of
Higher Education as a greater obstacle than the Ministry of
Education. Yes, they find government difficult to deal with as
political coalitions transform and ministers change often, but
at least government is sometimes responsive to political pres-
sures from private colleges and their families and likes the idea
of increasing higher education access without additional pub-
lic cost and of service to the job market. In contrast, the private
colleges believe that the council focuses largely on academic
concerns more appropriate for public universities and colleges,
thus establishing restrictions and undercutting the speed, flex-
ibility, and innovation private colleges need, as well as system
differentiation, experimentation, access without public
expense, and market tests for determining the value of private
colleges.
Public higher education institutions often oppose private
colleges' aspirations to strengthen themselves as they wish.
Public institutions sometimes do assert that regulation can
help the private colleges, as with quality assurance. Often, how-
ever, they seek to protect public institutions and values in soci-
ety at large. They further argue that private colleges in fact
enjoy ample autonomy (setting enrollment numbers, tuition
levels, and faculty wages and opening new programs). In other
words, private colleges already have the autonomy to strength-
en themselves.
Echoing a common international tendency, public universi-
ties are vocal proponents of regulation over private institu-
tions; but public colleges are especially fearful of private com-
petition, which focuses on teaching and training in popular
fields. Unlike universities, the public colleges do not sit at the
system's academic pinnacle, far above private colleges.
Instead, private colleges' strength is a threat to public colleges.
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The headline in the International Herald Tribune (November23, 2007) said it all: “To compete, Germany aims to rebuild
strength in research.” The article recounted how, having
assessed the performance of German higher education institu-
tions in worldwide rankings, the government started a pro-
gram to create its own “Ivy League.” The “excellence initiative”
follows similar moves by France, Russia, and Denmark, among
others. On the same day, the European Union passed a resolu-
tion reaffirming the need to “accelerate reform of universities
in order to . . . foster the emergence and strengthening of
European higher education institutions which can demon-
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Private institutions tend to be smaller and more
geographically concentrated; not uncommonly
they have higher student socioeconomic levels. 
strate their excellence at the international level.”
In other instances, higher education institutions are taking
the initiative themselves, merging competitive institutions to
create a larger critical mass (e.g., the University of North
London and London Guildhall University formed London
Metropolitan University, and University of Manchester
Institute of Science and Technology and Victoria University of
Manchester formed the University of Manchester) and creat-
ing global networks of research-intensive universities (e.g.,
Universitas 21, Coimbra Group, League of European Research
Universities, Worldwide Universities Network, and
International Alliance of Research Universities). 
Worldwide higher education rankings, of which the
Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Ranking of World Universities
is now a leading example, have highlighted research intensity
as the defining characteristic of higher education. Around the
world, governments and higher education institutions are
responding, and these developments are forcing changes in
higher education systems. This trend is especially true in
Europe where efforts to establish the European higher educa-
tion area and the European research area are challenging tradi-
tional assumptions about higher education systems and the
balance between equity, diversity, and excellence. 
Impact of Rankings
Rankings both manifest and drive the competitive global high-
er education environment. Despite criticism of the methodolo-
gies used, higher education leaders believe rankings help
maintain and build institutional reputation; good students use
rankings to shortlist university choice, especially at the post-
graduate level; and rankings influence national and interna-
tional partnerships and collaborations. Key stakeholders also
use rankings to influence their own decisions about accredita-
tion, funding, sponsorship, and employee recruitment.
While rankings have been dismissed by many people
because of methodological flaws, they cannot be ignored and
have become a driver of policy and institutional strategy. Given
the cost of achieving “world-class” excellence, many govern-
ments question whether research should be concentrated in
some higher education institutions or in clusters of institu-
tions. The pace of higher education reform is quickening in
the belief that better and more competitive higher education
institutions determine being more highly ranked. 
End of the Binary System? 
In the post–World War II massification era, many European
governments used legislative mechanisms to enforce mission
diversity, dividing higher education into two distinct institu-
tional types or sectors—a binary system. Unlike “traditional”
universities, polytechnics, Fachhochschulen, hogescholen, insti-
tutes of technology, and university colleges provided vocation-
ally or professionally relevant education responsive to regional
needs. Over time, credentialism and the growth of research to
underpin advanced qualifications, and recently the Bologna
process, have weakened the boundaries between elite and
mass education, vocational and academic, and technological
and traditional education. The “mission drift” has involved
both universities and new higher education institutions and
contributed to rising tension between the de jure and de facto
research function among these institutions. Today, nomencla-
ture often owes more to political rather than accreditation con-
cerns. 
Higher education policy has reflected these developments.
Until recently, importance was placed on massification/democ-
ratization and access—getting more people well educated.
There was little discrimination of various universities by the
public or government, although polytechnics or
Fachhochschulen were always considered and treated different-
ly, and few countries imposed barriers to student entry. The
emphasis is on quality and world-class excellence and selection
rather than recruitment. Many states are turning away from
regulatory mechanisms toward more opaque steerage and
competition to foster vertical differentiation.
Few governments have followed the United Kingdom's
1992 decision to convert all polytechnics overnight, but change
is occurring and the pace is quickening. For example, Norway's
1955 legislation allowing state colleges to apply for university
status opened up a minor floodgate, and a commission is now
seeking to balance institutional ambitions with national strate-
gies. Ireland faces similar pressures but has currently chosen
to boost research capacity or capability by giving funding for
cross-sector infrastructural and research projects and regional
collaborations. Flanders has established “university associa-
tions” bridging hogescholen and universities, to encourage
research partnerships. Fachhochschulen and hogescholen in the
Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland have adopted the title
“University of Applied Sciences” to align themselves with the
post-Bologna world and compete internationally. Both the
Dutch and the Swiss have been reconsidering the usefulness
of their binary system. The forthcoming Swiss legislation sug-
gests a compromise: a formal binary but within a single high-
er education system. 
These changes are provoking a political response. The
European University Association recently debated broadening
membership beyond traditional universities but met some
resistance from universities concerned with competitiveness
and spreading resources more widely or thinly. Such reactions
may indicate reluctance formally to “end the binary” or rede-
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ple because of methodological flaws, they cannot
be ignored and have become a driver of policy and
institutional strategy. 
fine it. Irish universities are differentiated between tertiary
(undergraduate) and fourth (postgraduate) level activity or
institutions and UK universities between teaching-only and
research universities. At the same time, a new network for
Universities of Applied Sciences (http://www.uasnet.org) looks
likely to flex its muscle.
A New Shape?
The details in each country vary but do represent a growing
urgency to reform Europe's higher education institutions for
competitiveness, while acknowledging that traditional univer-
sities can no longer meet all the geopolitical demands for
research, development, and innovation. As part of this process,
the European Commission is funding the development of a
European “Carnegie Classification” with emphasis on broad-
ening both horizontal and vertical differentiation. 
European societies have hitherto perceived education as a
social public good, available to everyone at little or no addition-
al cost. While rankings are not the cause of the changes, they
are fueling a reputational “arms race” and exploiting tensions
between equity and excellence. Governments are using a com-
bination of market mechanisms and competitive or perform-
ance- and output-based funding, with clear institutional mis-
sion descriptors or performance contracts. While the de jure
binary may linger in some countries, the creation of a broad-
ened and unified higher education system will further under-
mine its veracity. This will be a game of survival of the fittest. 
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Acommon international trend in higher education systemsis the growing autonomy of universities, especially in
financial matters. The role of central governments has become
setting political priorities and financial incentives for stimulat-
ing autonomous universities to accept these priorities as objec-
tives. It is important to design good models to allocate public
resources among universities.
This trend is particularly relevant in Italy, where traditional-
ly universities have held little autonomy and were subject to
strong control by the central government. Starting in the
1990s, numerous reforms have taken place in Italian higher
education. The objectives of these reforms ranged from
improving the financial autonomy of universities, giving them
autonomy in the organization of teaching matters, and estab-
lishing procedures for higher education assessment. The most
important change involved the budget situation. A law
approved in 1993 defined new principles for allocating
resources from the central government to universities. The tra-
ditional procedure was based on line-item budgets: the central
government allocated to each university budgets for each activ-
ity (e.g., teachers' wages and buying scientific facilities). This
system had many problems since it did not encourage univer-
sities to form their own strategies about resource utilization.
This mechanism was replaced by a lump-sum (block grant)
budget, autonomously managed by each university. This
reform forced universities to become more accountable. Now
they have to manage resources without bounds and sugges-
tions set by the Ministry of Education, Universities, and
Research. 
The First Allocation Model
After a period in which the allocation of public funds to uni-
versities was decided through a completely discretionary polit-
ical process, in 1997 a formula-based funding model was intro-
duced. The formula had the explicit goal to equilibrate the
resources among universities. The previous situation was char-
acterized by allocations related not to indicators about univer-
sities' activities but rather to their political ability in contract-
ing with the ministry, creating an imbalance across institu-
tions. 
The formula was adopted from 1997 to 2003, but it was
used for allocating only a part of the public budget: the main
part of it was still distributed according to traditional proce-
dures. The amount actually allocated through the formula was
only 1.5 percent in 1997, but it increased to about 10 percent in
2003. 
This formula faced two main problems. It did not consider
research activities, which are important for all the Italian insti-
tutions. Moreover, the weight attached to the number of stu-
dents (70%) excessively benefited large universities. Because
of these problems, the government abandoned this formula
and commissioned the National Evaluation Committee for a
new one. The committee has rigorously worked on a perform-
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The objectives of these reforms ranged from improv-
ing the financial autonomy of universities, giving
them autonomy in the organization of teaching
matters, and establishing procedures for higher
education assessment. 
